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Elkin: Compassion in Dying

NOTE

RENEWED COMPASSION FOR THE DYING
IN COMPASSION IN DYING v. STATE
OF WASHINGTON
[Compassion) is the supreme elixir
That overcomes the sovereignty of death.
It is the inexhaustible treasure
That eliminates poverty in the world.
It is the supreme medicine
That quells the world's disease.
It is the tree that shelters all beings
Wandering and tired on the path of conditioned
existence.
It is the universal bridge
That leads to freedom from unhappy states of
birth.
It is the dawning moon of the mind
That dispels the torment of disturbing
conceptions.
It is the great sun that finally removes
The misty ignorance of the world. 1

I. INTRODUCTION
In Compassion In Dying v. State of Washington,2 three
patients, five physicians, and a non-profit organization called
Compassion in Dying challenged the constitutionality of a
1. SOGYAL RINPOCHE, THE TIBETAN BOOK OF LMNG AND DYING 201 (1992)
(quoting SHANTIDEVA, A GUIDE TO THE BODHISATTVA'S WAY OF LIFE
(BODHICARYAVATARA) 34 (Stephen Batchelor trans., 1979». This passage praises the
joys of compassion. Id.
2. No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (opinion by
Reinhardt, J.), reu'g 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).

1
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Washington State statute which bans all assisted suicide, including physician-assisted death requested by terminally ill,
mentally competent adults. 3 The district court held the statute
unconstitutional for violating the patient-plaintiffs' Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests and equal protection rights." A
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that no constitutional right to die exists under either the Due Process or Equal
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 5 The Ninth Circuit granted review en
bane. 6 The en bane court issued a decision reversing the threejudge panel and affirming the district court's decision. 7 The en
bane court held "a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in
determining the time and manner of one's own death" exists
within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 The en bane court weighed this liberty interest against
Washington's legitimate and countervailing state interests, and
determined that the Washington statute is unconstitutional as
it prohibits physicians from prescribing life-ending medication
to terminally ill, mentally competent adults who choose to
hasten their deaths. 9
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.

THE PLAINTIFFS

The plaintiffs consisted of a non-profit organization called
Compassion in Dying, five physicians, and three terminally ill
patients. 1o Jane Roe was 69 years old and had been diagnosed
3. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D.
Wash. 1994). The statute at issue in this case states:
Promoting a suicide attempt. (1) A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or
aids another person to attempt suicide. (2) Promoting a
suicide is a Class C felony.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988).
4. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
5. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590 (9th Cir.
1995) (opinion by Noonan, J., joined by O'Scannlain; dissent by Wright, J.).
6. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
7. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996), rev'g 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
8. [d. at *l.
9. [d.

10. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588-89 (9th Cir.
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with cancer in 1988. 11 Since June 1993, Ms. Roe had been
bedridden. 12 By November 1993, her life expectancy was less
than six months. 13 At this point her doctor recommended she
enter a hospice for care and comfort.14 Despite her physical

1995). The appeal to the Ninth Circuit addressed only the claims by the three
individual patients, and not by the physicians or the non-profit organization. [d. at
590.
Compassion in Dying is a non-profit organization specifically formed to assist terminally ill, mentally competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths.
Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1458 (W.D.
Wash. 1994). It provides patients and their families free information, counseling,
emotional support, and other means of assistance. [d. To ensure the correct decision by the patient, Compassion in Dying has very strict eligibility requirements
for receiving assistance to die. [d. These requirements include: (1) The primary
care· physician must judge that the patient is, indeed, terminally ill; (2) The patient must be capable of understanding his or her own decisions; (3) A mental
health evaluation must be performed to prevent decisions motivated by depression,
emotional distress, or other mental illness; (4) The request to die must not be the
result of inadequate care, lack of health insurance, or other economic factors; (5)
The patient personally must request to die. Compassion in Dying will not accept
requests from family members or other people; however, the organization requires
the approval of immediate family and close friends; (6) The patient must have
requested assistance at least three times, with at least 48 hours between the
second and the third requests; and (7) The patient's decision to hasten death must
not be ambivalent or uncertain. [d. In addition, the organization requires its own
physicians to review the patient's medical records and verify the patient's prognosis and decision-making capabilities. [d.
The five physician-plaintiffs regularly treated terminally ill patients. [d.
They each claim to have received requests from these patients for assistance in
hastening death. [d. The physician-plaintiffs claim that sometimes their professional judgment required them to provide this help. [d. However, they each specifically
declared that the Washington statute had deterred them from doing so. [d.
11. [d. at 1456. The patient-plaintiffs used pseudonyms to protect their privacy. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 588. By the time this suit was flIed, Ms.
Roe's cancer had spread throughout her entire body and she was in the last stage
of the disease before death. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456. She had
already undergone chemotherapy, radiation, and various other cancer treatments.
[d. This produced little or no relief from the disease and the accompanying pain.
[d.
12. [d. In addition to pain, Ms. Roe also suffered from swollen legs, bed sores,
poor appetite, nausea and vomiting, impaired vision, incontinence of bowel, and
general weakness. [d.
13. [d.
14. [d. A hospice is a formal program of comfort care for persons in the last
six months of life which provides pain management, symptom control, and family
support. DEREK HUMPHRY, LAWFUL EXIT: THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM FOR HELP IN
DYING 15 (1993). Comfort care measures do not attempt to treat the illness, but
specifically attempt to relieve pain and discomfort in the last stages of a disease.
[d. Comfort care is generally used either when a patient's traditional medical
treatment is no longer effective, or when the burdens of a patient's illness outweigh the benefits of continued traditional medical treatment. TIMOTHY E. QUILL,
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ailments and discomfort, Ms. Roe was mentally competent. 15
She requested help from Compassion in Dying to hasten her
death using prescription drugs. 1s Because of the Washington
State statute, Compassion in Dying was unable to lawfully
provide prescription drugs to help Ms. Roe die. 17 Ms. Roe
eventually died prior to the district court's judgment in her
case challenging the statute. 18
John Doe, age 44, was dying of AIDS.19 At the time the
complaint was filed in district court, he was in the terminal
stage of his illness. 20 He was mentally competent and wanted
to hasten his death with doctor-prescribed drugs to prevent
further and unnecessary pain. 21 Because of the Washington
State statute, Compassion in Dying could not lawfully provide
Mr. Doe with this relief. 22 Mr. Doe died of natural causes before the district court entered judgment.23
James Poe was 69 years old and suffered from terminal
chronic emphysema and heart disease. 24 Mr. Poe required the
assistance of an oxygen tank. to breathe. 25 At the time this

M.D., DEATH AND DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE 76 (1993). Some
physicians oppose hospice care because an unintended shortening of the patient's
life is a side effect of this program. [d. at 78. However, one advantage of comfort
care is to humanize the process of dying by focusing on improving the quality of
life, rather than the length of life. [d. In addition, comfort care procedures emphasize the person, rather than the disease. [d. at 79.
15. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456.
16. [d. Ms. Roe complied with all Compassion in Dying's requirements. [d. See
supra note 10 for a list of the requirements.
17. See generally Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp.
1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988).
18. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir.
1995).
19. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456. Mr. Doe had been diagnosed
in 1991 and had since suffered from pneumonia twice, chronic and severe skin and
sinus infections, grand mal seizures, extreme fatigue, and cytomegalovirus retinitis
resulting in blindness. [d.
20. [d.
21. [d. at 1456-57. Mr. Doe had previously witnessed the long, suffering deaths
of both his companion from AIDS and his grandfather from diabetes. [d. at 1456.
He wished to avoid such suffering himself. See id.
22. See generally Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp.
1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988).
23. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 588.
24. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1457.
25. [d. Mr. Poe also had a constant sensation of suffocating and experienced
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suit was filed, he was in the terminal stage of incurable pulmonary and cardiac diseases. 26 Mr. Poe was mentally competent
and wanted to hasten his death through physician-prescribed
drugS. 27 Due to the Washington State statute, Compassion in
Dying was not lawfully allowed to provide this.28 Mr. Poe
lived to hear of the district court's judgment, but died of natural causes prior to the appeal before the three-judge panel of
the Ninth Circuit. 29
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Washington State statute as it applied to terminally ill, mentally competent adults who specifically request a physician's assistance
to hasten death. 3o They sought declaratory judgment to render the statute unconstitutional for violating the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.31
All plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.32 The district
court denied the summary judgment motions for the physicians
and for Compassion in Dying. 33 However, the district court
granted summary judgment for the patients, holding that the
statute violated terminally ill, mentally competent adults'

many panic attacks due to his inability to breathe. [d. In addition, his heart failure caused blockage of the blood flow to his extremities, resulting in severe leg
pain. [d.
26. [d.

27. [d.
28. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D.
Wash. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988).
29. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir.
1995).
30. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988); Compassion in Dying,
850 F. Supp. at 1455-56; Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 589; Compassion in
Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar.
6, 1996).
31. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 589.
33. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467. The district court did not address the claims brought by Compassion in Dying and the physician-plaintiffs
because these claims were not discussed in the briefs for the summary judgment
motions. [d. Therefore, the court denied their motions. [d. This issue was not on
appeal before the Ninth Circuit. See Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 589.
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Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest to choose physicianhastened death. 34 In addition, the district court held that the
statute violated the patient-plaintiffs' right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment because it prohibits physician-hastened death but permits withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment from substantially similarly situated patients. 36
Relying on two landmark Supreme Court cases, Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey36 and
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health,37 the district
court held that the patient-plaintiffs had a fundamental liberty
interest in "the freedom to make choices according to one's
individual conscience about those matters which are essential
to personal autonomy and basic human dignity. "38 The district
court also held that the undue burden standard cited in Casey
was the appropriate test to use in weighing this fundamental
right against the state's interests. 39 After examining the
state's interests and whether there was a substantial obstacle
to the patient-plaintiffs, the district court concluded that the
statute placed an undue burden on their rights. 40 In addition,
the district court ruled that the statute violated the patientplaintiffs' rights to equal protection, as contrasted with the
34. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
35. [d.

36. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
37. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
38. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461.
39. [d. at 1462-63. The majority in Casey held that the correct test for a facial
constitutional challenge to abortion regulations was whether the "state regulation
imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to [choose whether to have an
abortion)". Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819. Specifically, Casey held that "a finding of an
undue burden is shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus." [d. at 2820 (emphasis added). The district court
used the undue burden standard set out in Casey because a majority of the Casey
Court agreed that this standard is the "standard of general application to which
we intend to adhere". Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1463 (quoting Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2820). The Casey Court held that the undue burden standard is "the
appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the . . . right 'to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters . . . fundamentally affecting
a person. m Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819-20 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972». The district court found that Compassion in Dying concerns the
same liberty interest, thereby holding that the undue burden standard is to be
used here as well as in the abortion cases. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at
1463-64.
40. [d. at 1465.
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right of terminally ill patients in Washington to request withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment. 41 The statute at issue
prevents patients in substantially the same situation from
using other means to hasten their deaths.42
The State of Washington appealed the district court's
grant of summary judgment for the patient-plaintiffs to the
Ninth Circuit. 43 A Ninth Circuit three-judge panel considered
the appeal, and reversed the district court's decision. 44 The
Ninth Circuit then granted en bane review. 45 Shortly before
publication of this note, the en bane court issued its opinion
reversing the three-judge panel and affirming the district
court's holding. 46 With this decision, the Ninth Circuit recognized a constitutional liberty interest in determining the time
and manner of one's own death. 47

41. [d. at 1467. Washington State permits the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment from terminally ill patients, even if this withdrawal results in death.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West Supp. 1995). In addition, Washington State does not hold the physician culpable for these deaths. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.122.051 (West Supp. 1995).
Section 70.122.030(1), states in part:
A:ny adult person may execute a directive directing the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in
a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condition.
[d.

Section 70.122.051, provides that:
A:ny physician, health care provider acting under the
direction of a physician, or health facility and its personnel who participate in good faith in the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a qualified
patient in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, shall be immune from legal liability, including civil,
criminal, or professional conduct sanctions, unless otherwise negligent.
[d.
42. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
43. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir.
1995).
44. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.
1995).
45. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
46. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996).
47. [d. at *1. This note discusses the reversal of the three-judge panel decision
by the en bane court.
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III. BACKGROUND

A.

BASIS OF THE CONTROVERSY

Euthanasia was an accepted practice in ancient Greece
and Rome. 48 The term "euthanasia" derived from the Greek
language. 49 Ancient medical ethics required physicians to alleviate the patient's suffering, to lessen the violence of disease,
and to refuse to treat those who were overwhelmed by their
diseases. 50 The physicians knew that medicine was often powerless. 51 Therefore, they had a duty to treat only those patients they could help, and not those patients they could not
help.52
Controversy over euthanasia dates back at least as far as
the beginnings of Christianity.53 In the second and third cen-

48. Wendy N. Weigand, Has the Time Come for Doctor Death: Should Physician-Assisted Suicide be Legalized?, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 321, n.3 (1992-1993) (citing
Abigail Trafford, Society's View of Suicide, THE WASHINGTON POST, August 20,
1991, at Zll). Euthanasia is a deliberate life-shortening act administered on an
incurable patient in such a patient's interest, intending to create a quick, peaceful
death. DEREK HUMPHRY & ANN WICKETT, THE RIGHT TO DIE: UNDERSTANDING
EUTHANASIA 303 (1986).
Seneca, the famed Roman Stoic philosopher, hastened his death because he
was simply ready to die. Weigand, supra, at 321, n.3 (citing Trafford, supra, at
Zll).
It makes a great deal of difference whether a man is
lengthening his life or his death. But if the body is useless for service, why should one not free the struggling
soul? Perhaps one ought to do this a little before the debt
is due, lest, when it falls due, he may be unable to perform the act.
[d. at 325 (quoting JERRY B. WILSON, DEATH By DECISION: THE MEDICAL, MORAL,
AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA 22 (1975) (citing SENECA, EPISTULAE MoRALES, Vol I, lvii 32-36, at 407-9».
49. Weigand, supra note 48, at 322. "Eu" translates as "well" or "good";
"thanos" translates as "death." [d.
50. [d. at 324.
51. [d.

52. [d. (citing WILSON, supra note 48, at 19). "It is safe to say that a physician who prolonged the life of a person who could not ultimately recover his or
her health was considered to be acting unethically." Weigand, supra note 48, at
325 (quoting Darrell W. Amundsen, History of Medical Ethics: Ancient Greece and
Rome, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 930, 934 (1978) (citing PLATO, REpUBLIC
406A; DEMOSTHENES, THIRD OLYNTHIAC 33; PLUTARCH, MORALIA, 23(A»).
53. See HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 5-7.
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turies, Christians viewed all forms of euthanasia as suicide. 54
The Catholic Church advanced the belief that suicide was a
mortal sin, equivalent to murder. 55 Suicide was considered to
violate the strict interpretation of the Sixth Commandment of
the Bible as it left no time for the "sinner" to repent. 56 Historically, Christians believed that God alone may determine when
a person shall die. 57 This Christian view influenced church
law, as well as secular law. 58
In 1957, Pope Pius XII announced that a member of the
Catholic Church need only accept ordinary medical treatments,
and not extraordinary medical treatments to uphold the
faith. 59 Therefore, if a person survives only with the help of
extraordinary means, Catholic policy allows these means to be
removed, even if it results in death. 60 In addition, the Pope
allowed one to receive large doses of drugs to relieve unbearable pain for patients with incurable cancer, even if the drugs
shortened that patient's life. 61 However, this practice was ac-

54. Id. at 6.
55. Mark D. Frederick, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Personal Right?, 21 S.U.
L. REv. 59, 63 (1994) (citing A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF SUICIDE 4-26 (S.
Perlin ed., 1975».
56. HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 7. The Sixth Commandment
states, "Thou shalt not kill." EXQdus 20:13. The Bible does not specifically prohibit
or condemn suicide; it merely describes suicide in general terms. Frederick, supra
note 55, at 63.
57. HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 6. The prescribed Catholic stance
on euthanasia is: "Only God has the right to take away the life of the innocent,
and human suffering has a special value." Id. at 51 (quoting Gerald Kelly, MedicoMoral Problems, HOSPITAL PROGRESS, March 1950, Vol. 31, No.3, at 91).
58. HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 5-6. Early church law dictated
that if one committed "self-murder" then that person would not be given a Christian burial. Id. at 6. Civil penalties included confiscating the person's goods and
property to the detriment of the survivors and an ignominious burial on the highway, impaled by a stake. Id.
59. Id. at 195-96. Gerald Kelly, of the Society for Jesuit, defined ordinary
means as all medicines, treatments, and operations "which offer a reasonable hope
of benefit for the patient and which can be obtained and used without excessive
expense, pain, or other inconvenience." Id. at 196 (quoting GERALD KELLY, MEDICO-MORAL PROBLEMS 129 (1958». Extraordinary means are those which "cannot be
obtained or used without excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience, or which,
if used would not offer reasonable hope of benefit." Id. (quoting KELLY, supra, at
129).
60. See HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 196.
61. Id. at 52. This so-called "double-effect" is the unintended shortening of a
patient's life as a potential side effect for pain relief treatment. QUILL, supra note
14, at 78.
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ceptable to the Catholic religion only if no direct causal link
between the death and the will of the interested parties existed. 62 In other words, the Pope accepted passive euthanasia in
limited circumstances, but continued to denounce active euthanasia. 63
The traditional Judeo-Christian belief in the sanctity of
life is based on beliefs in God and that life has a purpose. 54
The Judeo-Christian influence on law and ethics has survived
throughout the years. 65 Laws against assisted death are rooted in religious origins. 66 However, neither such laws nor the

62. HUMPHRY & WICKETI, supra note 48, at 52. As long as the primary purpose of the treatment was to relieve suffering, the double effect of pain relief and
death absolved the physician from responsibility for indirectly contributing to the
patient's death. QUILL, supra note 14, at 78. This also absolved the Catholic doctor
or patient from committing a "sin". See HUMPHRY & WICKETI, supra note 48, at
52.
63. [d. at 288. "Passive suicide" or "passive euthanasia" has been defined as
the deliberate disconnection of life support equipment, or cessation of any medical
procedure, permitting the death of a patient. HUMPHRY, supra note 14, at 12.
"Active euthanasia" has been defined as the action of one person directly helping
another to die on request, such as injecting the patient with medication intended
to hasten death. [d. "Assisted suicide" has been defined as providing the means by
which a person can take his or her own life, such as a doctor giving the patient a
prescription for medication intended to hasten death. [d. "Self-deliverance" has
been defined as an irreversibly ill person making a rational decision to end his or
her own life. [d.
In addition to Catholicism, most other Christian religions currently do not
oppose passive euthanasia because simply removing extraordinary medical means
may be viewed as a natural death and, therefore, part of God's will. HUMPHRY &
WICKETI, supra note 48, at 288. Judaism also allows passive, or "indirect," euthanasia as long as the patient's death is merely the unpremeditated result of some
medication given to relieve pain or is a consequence of withdrawal of medical
treatment. [d. at 289 (citing RABBI IMMANUEL JAKOBOVITS, JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE JEWISH RELIGIOUS ATIlTUDES
TO MEDICINE AND ITS PRACTICE 345 (1959».
64. See supra text accompanying notes 53-63.
65. See Frederick, supra note 55, at 63. See also HUMPHRY & WICKETI, supra
note 48, at 218. Courts have generally disregarded using humane motive and the
patient's terminal condition as factors in mercy killing cases, reflecting the "sanctity of life" tradition. HUMPHRY & WICKETI, supra note 48, at 218. "[C]onsent of the
deceased is not a defense in a prosecution for homicide. The right of life and personal security is not only sacred ... it is inalienable." Martin v. Commonwealth,
37 S.E.2d 43, 47 (Va. 1946) (quoting 26 AM. JUR. Homicide § 103). "One who
commits euthanasia bears no ill will toward his victim and believes his act is
morally justified, but he nonetheless acts with malice if he is able to comprehend
that society prohibits his act regardless of his personal belief." People v. Conley,
411 P.2d 911, 918 (Cal. 1966) (emphasis added).
66. See Frederick, supra note 55, at 59; Weigand, supra note 48, at 326;
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opponents of euthanasia acknowledge that people of other
religions and non-believers may have rights and beliefs as
well. 67
B. MODERN HISTORY
The New Jersey Supreme Court first allowed the withdrawal of treatment from an incompetent patient in In re
Quinlan. 68 The court noted that the United States Supreme
Court found the constitutional right of privacy to exist in the
"penumbra of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.,,69
Applying the United States Supreme Court's recognition that a
personal privacy right exists and that the Constitution guarantees certain areas of privacy, the Quinlan court expanded the
privacy right to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment. 70
The Quinlan court held that the state's interest in preserving life weakens, while the patient's right to privacy grows, "as
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis
dims.'>7l The New Jersey Supreme Court held that Ms.

HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 5-7.
67. HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 165.
68. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). Ms. Quinlan had stopped breathing resulting in
coma and decortication, a condition relating to derangement of the brain's cortex.
[d. at 654. She required a respirator to breathe. [d. Her doctor testified that she
remained in a coma from the time that she arrived at the hospital, and characterized her as being in a "chronic, persistent vegetative state" with no cognitive function. [d. However, the doctors did not consider this condition brain dead. [d.
69. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965».
70. [d. at 663-64 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969». The Quinlan court likened this right to that of a
woman's right to choose an abortion. [d. at 663 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153 (1973». The Massachusetts Supreme Court has also held such a privacy interest exists:
The right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression
of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life. The value of
life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision to refuse
treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human
being the right of choice.
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426
(Mass. 1977).
71. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
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Quinlan's interest in being free of bodily invasion outweighed
the state's interest in preserving her life. 72
The Quinlan decision has had a profound effect on "living
will" legislation in many states other than New Jersey, as well
as on public opinion. 73 In addition, this case affected case law
in other jurisdictions, such as Massachusetts, where the Supreme Court held that a terminally ill, incompetent patient
has a right to have invasive medical treatment withdrawn,
even if the withdrawal of treatment will result in death. 74
Further, Washington State has extended this concept to allow
withdrawal of artificial means of nutrition and hydration. 75

72. Id. The Massachusetts Supreme Court has since held a state's interests
against euthanasia are: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining
the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
73. HUMPHRY & WICKE'IT, supra note 48, at 108-14. A living will is an advance directive that provides specific instructions about health care treatment.
QUILL, supra note 14, at 224. In particular, it reflects the patient's wishes to refuse, or to retain, life-sustaining treatment if the patient becomes incompetent in
the future. Id. The will is "living" in the sense that it is activated when a person
loses mental capacity but remains alive. Id. at 190.
In 1977, one year after the Quinlan decision, fifty living will bills were
introduced in thirty-eight state legislatures. HUMPHRY & WICKE'IT, supra note 48,
at 108. Eight states signed them into law. Id. This is compared to only five states
introducing such bills before 1975. Id. In addition, just prior to the Quinlan decision, only seventeen bills were introduced and none were signed into law. Id.
Furthermore, before 1975, the Euthanasia Education Council satisfied 750,000
requests for its sample version of a living will, as compared to 1.25 million requests in the year and a half after Quinlan. Id. at 114.
74. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977). The facts of Saikewicz differ from Quinlan in two respects: (1)
Saikewicz concerned a terminally ill patient as opposed to one in a persistent
vegetative state, and (2) the patient in Saikewicz was severely mentally retarded
(therefore, he was never competent) as opposed to one who had become incompetent. Id. at 420-21. Despite these differences, the court still held that a constitutional right to privacy exists which encompasses "an expression of the sanctity of
individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life."
Id. at 426. In addition, the court indicated that, like in Quinlan, as the patient's
prognosis decreases, the state's interest in preserving that life weakens. Id. at 42526.
75. In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 454 (Wash. 1987). "The right
to have life-sustaining treatment withheld extends to all artificial procedures which
serve only to prolong the life of a terminally ill patient." Id. The court deferred to
the legislature to address assisted suicide. Id. at 455. The resulting statute, WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988), is at issue in Compassion in Dying v.
State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996).
The Washington Supreme Court held that Washington State's interests
against euthanasia are: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of interests
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The United States Supreme Court, in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep't of Health, found that a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
exists. 76 The Court stated that one has the right to refuse
artificial life-saving nutrition and hydration. 77 Therefore, the
right to refuse medical treatment exists even if exercising that
right results in death. 78 However, the Court specifically left
open the question of whether the Constitution also permits
physician-assisted death, thereby not foreclosing the existence
of this right.79 In addition, the Court acknowledged that "[t]he
choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of
obvious and overwhelming finality."80
Public perception of euthanasia has changed over time. A
1991 opinion poll sponsored by the Boston Globe and Harvard
School of Public Health showed that 64% of Americans favor
access to physician-assisted death for terminally ill patients. 81
In 1988, the San Francisco Medical Society surveyed its physician-members and found that 70% of the 676 respondents
of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) the maintenance of
the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Grant, 747 P.2d at 451 (citing In re
: Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983». In addition, the court held that "the amount
of pain endured by a dying patient is a significant factor to be considered [when
deciding whether the right to withhold life-sustaining treatment can attach]. . . .
The individual's right to die with dignity must not be ignored." Id. at 450-51.
76. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
Washington State permits terminally ill patients to refuse medical treatment even
if this refusal will result in death. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West
Supp. 1995). In addition, any physician who refrains from treating a patient, according to that patient's wishes, will not be prosecuted even in the event of that
patient's death. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.051 (West Supp. 1995).
77. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
78. See id. See also Victoria L. Helms, Assisted Suicide: Giving Meaning to the
Right to Die, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 173 (1993).
79. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-78. "[I]n deciding 'a question of such magnitude
and importance . . . it is the [better] part of wisdom not to attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the subject.'" Id. (quoting Twin
City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897». Therefore, the Court has not
denied that an individual's right to privacy may include physician-assisted death.
Frederick, supra note 55, at 88.
80. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. The United States Supreme Court has since held
that deeply personal choices are within the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty interest. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2807 (1992). One such choice is the choice between life and death, as acknowledged by the Cruzan Court. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
81. Weigand, supra note 48, at 342 (citing Richard A. Knox, Poll: Americans
Favor Mercy Killing, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1991, at 1).
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agreed that terminally ill patients should have the option of
requesting active euthanasia. 82
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS

A. DUE PROCESS
In its analysis of Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that no
constitutional right to "aid in killing oneself' exists under the
United States Constitution. 83 The three-judge panel disagreed
with the district court's use of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 84 to assert a right to die. 85 It

82. Steve Heilig, The SFMS Euthanasia Survey: Results and Analyses, SAN
FRANCISCO MEDICINE, May 1988, at 24. This change in attitude may be attributed
in part to the media's coverage of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, who has assisted several
patients to die. See Weigand, supra note 48, at 331-32. However, while Dr.
Kevorkian may think that his publicity will increase public favor for physicianassisted death, his methods may actually hamper euthanasia advocates' efforts to
legalize this practice. See QUILL, supra note 14, at 153. In 1991, Washington
State's Initiative 119, which would have legalized physician-assisted death for
terminally ill, mentally competent patients, lost by a 54 to 46 percent margin. 1d.
at 152-53. During the week before the vote, Dr. Kevorkian assisted two more
deaths, which may have enhanced Washington voters' fears about adequate safeguards and the potential for abuse. 1d. at 153. In addition, Dr. Kevorkian's actions
have precipitated Michigan's ban on physician-assisted death. Weigand, supra note
48, at 333, n.73.
Dr. Kevorkian has been admired by many for his principles regarding physician-assisted death. DEREK HUMPHRY, DYING WITH DIGNITY: UNDERSTANDING EuTHANASIA 40 (1992). However, his well-publicized actions, his brief acquaintance
with his patients before they die, and his disregard for the law have all earned
him severe criticism. HUMPHRY, supra note 14, at 23. Some specific criticisms of
Dr. Kevorkian include: (1) that he does not have the knowledge or experience to
ensure that all alternative medical approaches have been exhausted, or that the
patient's wish to die is not based upon depression; (2) that he has not developed a
deep or long-standing relationship with the patient; (3) that he has not researched
all information about the irreversibility of each patient's illness or about comfort
care measures; (4) that he has assisted patients whose medical conditions have
been ambiguous and uncertain; and (5) that he has used the deaths to gain publicity to promote his own ideas about death. QUILL, supra note 14, at 124-25.
83. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590, 591 (9th
Cir. 1995).
84. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Freedom to make choices according to one's individual conscience about those matters which are essential to personal autonomy
and basic human dignity, including a woman's choice to have an abortion, is a
fundamental liberty interest. 1d.
85. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590. Specifically, the district court held
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found that the district court used Casey's language out of context, stating that Casey applies only to regulating abortion and
does not create a right to commit suicide. 86 Therefore, the district court had made an "enormous leap" in holding that such a

there is a "right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and the mystery of human life." Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2801).
86. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590. The Casey language referred to is:
[M]atters . . . involving the most intimate and personal .
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
Throughout Compassion in Dying, the three-judge panel used the terms
"killing oneself' and "suicide," rather than "assisted death" or "self-deliverance."
See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
"Suicide" can be defined as an irrational decision to cause one's own death, due to
emotional or psychological pressures. See HUMPHRY, supra note 14, at 12-13. Advocates of the right to assisted death claim this term is inaccurate and unfair. Id. at
12. "Self-deliverance" is defined as the rational decision by a terminally ill patient
to end one's own life. Id. Patient-plaintiffs argued that the term "suicide" is an
inaccurate characterization of a terminally ill patient's decision to hasten his or
her death. Brief of Appellees at 6-7, n.5, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.) (No. 94-35534) (1995).
I find it appalling that the pejorative label "suicide"
would be put on a terminally ill person's choice to hasten
his or her inevitable death. In no meaningful sense of the
term can a choice to hasten one's own inevitable death by
the use of physician-prescribed medications be labeled a
"suicide." ... The terminally ill person, who is facing
death, and who seeks to have the choice to hasten that
inevitable death, is not "committing suicide" by ending a
life that otherwise is of indefinite duration. The life of the
terminally ill person is coming to an end, and the question is whether the terminally ill person must undergo
unbearable suffering until death comes "naturally", or
whether that person can make the choice to end the unbearable suffering by the use of physician-prescribed medications.
Id. at 7, n.5 (quoting Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Hastening Ineuitable
Death, HAsTINGS CENTER REP., Sep.-Oct. 1993, at 20, 22). See also Leslie Bender,
A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Voluntary Actiue Euthanasia,
59 TENN. L. REV. 519, 527-30 (1992). "When we call doctors' actions 'aiding suicide,' 'euthanasia,' or 'killing,' we prefigure the ensuing debate. These labels carry
pejorative baggage." [d. at 527-28.
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right exists. 87 However, the en bane opinion relied heavily on
Casey and the abortion cases to find a due process liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one's own
death. as
The three-judge panel opinion implied that the panel did
not wish to extend due process rights to previously unarticulated circumstances. 89 The opinion explained that if the district
court's assertion was correct, it would lead to absurd results. 90
Specifically, the three-judge panel stated that if a right to
assistance in suicide truly exists, then this right would apply
to every "sane" adult regardless of physical illness. 91 Restricting its application only to the terminally ill would be "illusory. "92 Therefore, the three-judge panel held that the proposed
constitutional right cannot be restricted at all. 93 The en bane
court, however, clearly limited its holding to terminally ill,

87. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590.
88. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848, at *7-8, 18-19 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). The en bane court examined the
compelling similarities between right-to-die cases and abortion cases. ld. at *7.
First, "In the former as in the latter, the relative strength of the competing interests changes as physical, medical, or related circumstances vary." ld. Second,
"Equally important, both types of cases raises issues of life and death, and both
arouse similar religious and moral concerns. Both present basic questions about an
individual's right of choice." ld.
The en bane court stated that the fundamental message of Casey regarding
the issue in the present case is: "These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to person dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." ld. at *8 (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807). The en bane court stated
that a patient's decision whether to endure or avoid unrelieved misery and torture
"constitutes one of the most, if not the most, 'intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime,' a choice that is 'central to personal dignity and
autonomy.' Surely such a decision implicates a most vital liberty interest." ld. at
*19 (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807).
89. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591. The three-judge panel stated that
since no court had ever specifically held that a constitutional right to "aid in killing oneself' exists, it would not and should not "invent a constitutional right unknown to the past and antithetical to the defense of human life that has been a
chief responsibility of our constitutional government." ld.
90.ld.
91. ld.
92. ld. The three-judge panel did not provide legal authority or analysis for
holding that constitutional rights cannot be narrowly tailored to a certain group to
which that right applies. See' id.
93. ld. at 590.
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mentally competent adults who wish to hasten their own
deaths. 94
Next, the three-judge panel explained that the Supreme
Court's holding in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health 95 does not extend to a terminally ill patient's right to
gain assistance in suicide. 96 Therefore, the three-judge panel
denied that a right to choose to die exists because the district
court lacked a basis in precedent to assert this right. 97 In contrast, the en bane court found that Cruzan, by acknowledging a
liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining nutrition and hydration, even when this refusal results in death, necessarily recognizes a liberty interest in hastening one's own death. 98
Further, the three-judge panel held that a right-to-die
lacks foundation in American tradition and history because no
court has ever upheld a right to aid in killing oneself. 99 Again,

94. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848, at *5, n.9 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). "Declaring a statute unconstitutional as
applied to members of a group is atypical but not uncommon." [d. (citing Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207
(1972».
95. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
96. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 59l. Cruzan held that "the United States
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition", even at risk of death. Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 279. The three-judge panel in Compassion in Dying reasoned that Cruzan applied only to a patient's limited right to refuse medical treatment and that this
right is not synonymous with a right to actively kill oneself. Compassion in Dying,
49 F.3d at 591. The three-judge panel stated this difference was due to the fact
that the majority of states have imposed criminal liability on those who assist another to commit suicide. [d. However, it did not acknowledge that the very issue
in this case is whether those criminal sanctions in the context at issue are constitutional. See id.
97. [d.
98. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *20.
99. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 59l. Patient-plaintiffs argued that there
is a right to choose to die, which includes a right to assistance in effecting that
choice. Brief of Appellees, at 14, n.12, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.) (No. 94-35534) (1995). This is similar to a woman
having the right to assistance in having an abortion, rather than forcing the woman to perform her abortion herself. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). They
contend, therefore, that a physician's assistance is necessary to the exercise of a
terminally ill patient's right to choose to hasten death. Brief of Appellees, at 14,
n.12, Compassion in Dying (No. 94-35534).
The alternatives are violent suicide - horrific and almost
unimaginable for a nondisturbed person - or an unassist-
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the en bane court disagreed, considering American tradition
and history more broadly to find that "the relevant historical
record is far more checkered than the majority [of the threejudge panel] would have us believe."lOo The en bane court also
stated that the three-judge panel erred by concluding that a
historical analysis alone is a sufficient basis to reject the
plaintiffs' claim to a liberty interest. 101

ed attempt with poison or drugs that have not been prescribed specifically for this purpose. The undisputed record
shows that terminally ill persons who seek to hasten
death need medical counseling regarding the type of drugs
and the amount and manner in which they should be
taken, as well as a prescription, which only a doctor can
provide. Attempts to hasten death without such advice
.frequently fail, often leaving the patient in worse shape
than before or succeed only after terrible pain and suffering. The emotional and psychological effect on terminally
ill persons of their inability to obtain assistance from
their physicians can be devastating; patients feel abandoned by their physicians when most in need of help.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally QUILL, supra note 14.
Washington law already allows terminally ill patients to end their lives
without any assistance by allowing the patient to choose to cease medical treatment. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West Supp. 1995). In addition,
suicide and attempted suicide, even for mentally unstable individuals, are not
crimes in Washington. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp.
1454, 1464, n.9 (W.O. Wash. 1994). Washington also absolves doctors and health
care workers from civil, criminal, and professional conduct liability when assisting
a terminally ill person to withdraw treatment. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
70.122.051 (West Supp. 1995). Therefore, Washington already recognizes the need
for physician assistance in carrying out the patient's right to hasten death. See id.
100. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *13.
101. Id. at *12. The en bane court cited Loving v. Virginia as an example of
the Supreme Court finding a substantive due process right to exist, despite the
fact that anti-miscegenation laws were commonplace in our nation's history. Id.
(citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967».
It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm
of personal liberty which the government may not enter.
We have vindicated this principle before. Marriage is
mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial
marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century,
but the Court was no doubt correct in finding it to be an
aspect of liberty protected against state interference by
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause in
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) . . . . Similar examples may be found in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
94-99 (1987) ... ; in Carey v. Population Service International, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) . . . ; in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965).
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805 (parallel citations omitted).
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Rather than analyzing the district court's usage of the
undue burden standard of review, the three-judge panel applied the rigid standard used in United States v. Salerno. 102
Salerno states that to facially challenge a statute based on
constitutionality, the challengers "must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid."103 Using the Salerno test, the three-judge panel pointed
out that the statute is constitutional in some circumstances,
such as the prevention of teenage suicides or fraud upon the
elderly.104 Therefore, the three-judge panel held that the statute is not facially unconstitutional under the Salerno standard. l05
The en bane court did not rely on the undue burden standard nor the strict Salerno standard. 106 Instead, the en bane
court found that in substantive due process cases, a balancing
test is the appropriate analysis. l07 The en bane court declined
to adopt either the two-tier or three-tier tests, depending on
the classification of the right. lOS Rather, the en bane court
adopted a continuum approach, wherein the more important
the individual right or interest, the more persuasive the justification for governmental infringement would need to be. 109 Although the en bane court declined to definitively classify the
right at issue as fundamental or merely important, it made

102. 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591. See supra
note 39 for an explanation of the undue burden standard used in Casey.
103. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745).
104. [d.
105. [d.
106. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848, at *5, n.9 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996).
107. [d. at *5. "Whether [the individual's] constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state
interests." [d. (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
279 (1990) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982»). See also Mills
v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982). The Cruzan Court also noted that the balancing test is deeply rooted in this nation's legal traditions, noting that it has been
used in substantive due process cases at least since 1905. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278
(citing Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). In 1905, the Supreme Court
balanced an individual's liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine
against the state's interest in preventing disease. Jacobsen, 197 U.S. 11.
108. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *11.
109. [d.
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"one point. .. absolutely clear: there can be no legitimate
argument that rational basis review is applicable."uo
Weighing Washington's interests against the individual's
decision to die, the three-judge panel decided the state has
certain interests which outweigh an individual's choice to
die. 111 The three-judge panel acknowledged the interests as:
1. Preserving the integrity of the physician's
professional ethics as perceived by the physician
and by not having physicians in the role of "killers of their patients. "112
The three-judge panel suggested that physicians might begin to think. that killing patients
is an acceptable alternative to curing or treating
the patient, especially if there is no known cure
for the patient's disorder.113
2. Protecting the elderly or infirm from psychological pressure to consent to their own

110. Id.

111. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591-93 (9th Cir.
1995). The three-judge panel listed these interests based on two task force reports,
cited by appellants and amici in their appellate briefs to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at
591-92. These reports are New York State Task Force, When Death is Sought:
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context, 1994 and Michigan Commission on Death and Dying, Final Report, 1994. Id.
Governor Cuomo commissioned the New York task force in 1985. Id. at 592.
Twenty-four members represented ethical, religious, legal, and medical views. Id.
"Respect for individual choice and self-determination has served as a touchstone
for public policies about medical decisions over the past two decades." Brief of
Appellees at 27, n.29, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586
(9th Cir.) (No. 94-35534) (1995) (quoting NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, WHEN
DEATH IS SOUGHT: AsSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 1
(1994». Because of this policy, a number of the task force members believed that
for terminally ill, mentally competent individuals, assistance in dying would be
proper and ethical. Id. at 15, n.13 (citing NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra, at
120, 140). However, these members still voted against recommending legislative
reform for fear that ineligible individuals would improperly choose this option. Id.
(citing NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra, at 120, 140).
The Michigan commission started in 1992. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at
592. It agreed by majority vote to recommend legislative change in the Michigan
law against assisted death. Id. However, the commission did not challenge the
constitutionality of the existing Michigan legislation. Id. Neither of the task force
reports were provided to the district court. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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deaths. U4
The three-judge panel anticipated that
physicians might seek out the best candidates
for suicide and that some patients would feel
compelled to agree to their doctor's recommendation.u5
3. Preventing exploitation of minorities and
the poor. U6
The three-judge panel reasoned that due to
economic circumstances, minorities and the poor
have fewer options in treatment and the alleviation of pain. 117 Therefore, they may be more
likely to desire suicide. uB The three-judge panel stated that the patients may choose to reduce
the cost of treatment by quickly terminating life
to avoid a prolonged illness. U9
4. Protecting people with disabilities from
societal indifference and antipathy.120
The three-judge panel stated that the public
would create and strengthen the stereotype that
seriously disabled people should want to die, and
that the disabled person would begin to believe
this stereotype, thereby creating the desire to
commit suicide. 121
5. Preventing physician or patient abuse of
the right to die. 122

114. [d.
115. [d.
116. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592.
117. [d.
118. [d.
119. [d. "[T]he cost of treatment is viewed as relevant to decisions at the bedside." [d. (quoting NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 111, at 129). The
three-judge panel reasoned that reducing the treatment of treatable illnesses in the
poor would make them the "primest candidates for . . . physician-recommended
suicide." [d. (emphasis added). The three-judge panel did not acknowledge that the
issue in this case regards only patients who are not treatable and who have chosen, through their own decision, not their physician's recommendation, to hasten
their inevitable deaths. See id.
120. [d. at 592-93.
121. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592-93. However, the three-judge panel
did not acknowledge that this case only regards terminally ill patients and not
those with disabilities. See id.
122. [d. at 593. In explaining this interest, the three-judge panel only cited
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The state interests identified by the en bane court in part
overlapped with those previously cited by the Washington
Supreme Court,123 and included: (1) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) avoiding the involvement of third parties
and in precluding the uses of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; (4) protecting family members and loved ones; (5) protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and (6) avoiding
adverse consequences. 124 Weighing these interests against an
individual's liberty interest, the en bane court identified relevant factors necessary to consider in balancing. 125 After carefully considering each state interest in light of these factors,
and conceding the importance of many of the state interests,
the en bane court nonetheless found that the state interests
simply do not outweigh the strong liberty interest at stake. 126

minimal statistics available from the Netherlands where physician-assisted death
for terminally ill, mentally competent patients is not criminalized. See id. The
three-judge panel announced that, in 1990, 1.8 percent of all deaths in the Netherlands resulted from patient-requested death and that an additional 0.8 percent of
all deaths resulted without a contemporaneous request to end the patient's life. Id.
(citing NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note Ill, at 133-34). However, these
are the only statistics cited by the three-judge panel in support of the interest
against abuse. See id. at 593. It did not discuss whether these statistics are significant nor whether they even reflect an abuse of one's right to choose to die. See
id.
A study of the Netherlands' physician-assisted death practices shows that in
half the cases where the assisted death did not comply with the Netherlands'
criteria for consent, the patient had previously expressed a wish to die, but became incompetent before being able to give a valid request. QUILL, supra note 14,
at 149. In addition, many of the unconsented deaths resulted from the "double
effect" of administering pain medication, which happened to result in death. Id.
Overall, there is not enough data to accurately judge whether these statistics represent abuse at all; however, the study suggests that abuse of physician-assisted
death occurred less frequently than speculated and the vast majority of patients
died within accepted guidelines. Id. at 150.
123. In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (Wash. 1987); In re Colyer,
660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983). See infra text at note 173 for a list of the articulated interests, and text and accompanying notes 178-197 for a discussion of these
interests.
124. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848, at *21-33 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996).
125. Id. at *21. These factors include: (1) the importance of the various state
interests, both in general and in the factual context of the case; (2) the manner in
which those interests are furthered by the state law or regulation; (3) the importance of the liberty interest, both in itself and in the context in which it is being
exercised; (4) the extent to which that interest is burdened by the challenged state
action; and (5) the consequences of upholding or overturning the statute or regulation. Id.
126. Id. at *21-33.
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In addition, the en bane court identified safeguards that could
be taken to minimize the risks advanced by the state. 127
The three-judge panel criticized the scope of the district
court judgment as being indefinite. 128 It first stated that if
the right to die is a liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be applicable to
all "sane" adults, not just those who are terminally ill. 129
Therefore, since this right would apply to everyone, the threejudge panel found that it is "illusory" and absurd. 130
The three-judge panel recognized that too much uncertainty existed as to whom the district court's judgment applied. 13l
It found that, since all three patient-plaintiffs were deceased
by the time of the appeal, the district court's judgment was
moot as it relates to the original patient-plaintiffs.132 The en
bane court rejected this determination, stating that "since the
District Court properly granted the physicians standing to assert the rights of their terminally ill patients in general, it is
clear that this case was not rendered moot by the death of the
three named patients."133 The three-judge panel found that

127. [d. at *34. These proposed safeguards include, but are not limited to: (1)
witnesses to ensure voluntariness; (2) reasonable, though short, waiting periods to
prevent rash decisions; (3) second medical opinions to confirm the patient's terminal status and to confmn that the patient has been receiving proper medical
treatment, including adequate comfort care; (4) psychological examinations to ensure that the patient is not suffering from momentary or treatable depression; and
(5) reporting procedures that will aid in the avoidance of abuse. [d.
[W]e believe that sufficient protections can and will be
developed by the various states, with the assistance of the
medical profession and health care industry, to ensure
that the possibility of error will be remote. We do not expect that, in this nation, the development of appropriate
statutes and regulations will be taken lightly by any of
the interested parties, or that those charged with their
enforcement will fail to perform their duties properly.
[d.
128. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir.
1995).
129. [d. at 591. See supra text accompanying notes 84-94 for discussion.
130. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590-91. See supra text accompanying
notes 84-94 for discussion.
131. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 593.
132. [d.
133. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848, at "'3 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (citing Compassion in Dying v. State of
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the district court did not define "terminally ill". 134 The threejudge panel refused to assume that the definition used in another Washington statute could be applied here. l35 Therefore,
since the district court did not attempt to specify to whom this
right would apply, the district court created an "amorphous
class of beneficiaries ... in this non-class action."136 The en
bane court recognized the difficulties in defining "terminally
ill," but found that the term "is neither indefinable nor undefined.,,137 Therefore, the en bane court held that definitional
difficulties are not reason enough to deny that a liberty interest in hastening one's own death exists. 138
B. EQUAL PROTECTION

The three-judge panel continued its analysis by distinguishing patients simply refusing life support from those seeking medical help to actively bring about death. 139 Since the
Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash. 1994».
134. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 593.
135. ld. The definition states:
"Tenninal condition" means an incurable and irreversible
condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, that, within
reasonable medical judgment, will cause death within a
reasonable period of time in accordance with accepted
medical standards, and where the application of life-sustaining treatment serves only to prolong the process of
dying.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020(9) (West Supp. 1995).
The three-judge panel stated the difficulties with such an assumption are:
(1) that "tenninally ill" and "tenninal condition" are different terms; (2) that considerable variation exists as to whom the plaintiffs consider to be tenninally ill;
and (3) that the states disagree in their definitions of "tenninally ill." Compassion
in Dying, 49 F.3d at 593. The three-judge panel then stated that life itself is a
terminal condition, whereas a tenninal illness varies depending on the kind of
illness it is and the time that illness takes to cause death. [d.
136. Id.
137. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *32.
138. Id. "[Ilt is apparent that purported definitional difficulties that have repeatedly been surmounted provide no legitimate reason for refusing to recognize a
liberty interest in hastening one's death." Id.
139. See Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591, 593-94. The three-judge panel
held that in one instance a patient merely requests the ending of unwanted treatment, as opposed to a patient who "seeks the right to have a second person collaborate in [his or herl death." [d. at 594.
The three-judge panel cited Cruzan to show that a distinction between the
two types of death exists, based on the fact that "the majority of States in: this
country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to com-
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three-judge panel found that this difference does not involve
either a fundamental right or a suspect classification, it applied a rational basis test. 14O The three-judge panel held that
the plaintiffs failed to prove that the Washington State statute
had no rational basis to be upheld. 141 Because the en bane
court held that a violation of due process rendered the statute
unconstitutional, it found it unnecessary to consider the
plaintiffs' equal protection argument and declined to address
it. 142
V. CRITIQUE

A. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DIE EXISTS

The United States Supreme Court has extended due process rights in the past when it has found the right to be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"l43 or "of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. "144

mit suicide." [d. at 591 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 280 (1990». However, the three-judge panel did not acknowledge that
the very issue in this case is whether those criminal penalties are constitutional
in the context at issue. See id. In addition, the three-judge panel noted that the
common law doctrine of informed consent allows one to have or reject medical
treatment as the patient sees fit. [d. at 594. The touching of a person by another
without informed consent is battery. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. The patient has
"the right to be let alone." Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594 (quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting».
However, the three-judge panel explained that when a patient asks someone else
to cause death, the patient is doing more than merely asking to be let alone. [d.
It reasoned that this is a different kind of action than merely refusing medical
treatment. See id.
140. [d. at 593-94. The three-judge panel held that this distinction must be
upheld unless patient-plaintiffs can show "that the legislature's actions were irrational." [d. at 593 (quoting Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450,
458 (1988».
141. [d. at 594.
142. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *39. "One constitutional violation
is enough to support the judgment that we reach here." [d.
143. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). "[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." [d. (emphasis added).
144. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). "The right to trial by jury
and the immunity from prosecution except as the result of an indictment may
have value and importance. Even so, they are not of the very essence of a scheme
of ordered liberty." [d. (emphasis added).
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1. Nation's History and Tradition

To extend due process to the right to die, the three-judge
panel of the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying v. State of
Washington required this proposed right to have foundation in
the traditions and history of our nation. l45 Since the threejudge panel concluded that no such foundation exists, it refused to extend due process rights to a terminally ill patient's
personal decision to die. 146 However, the en bane court engaged in a comprehensive examination of American history
and tradition to support its finding of a liberty interest. 147
Courts have determined that the Constitution is a living,
dynamic document, susceptible to interpretation and expansion
regarding the right of personal privacy or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.l48 In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the United States Supreme Court agreed with this view that the Fourteenth
Amendment interest must not be defined too specifically.149

145. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.
1995). "In the two hundred and five years of our existence no constitutional right
to aid in killing oneself has ever been asserted and upheld by a court of final
jurisdiction. . . . [A] federal court should not invent a constitutional right unknown
to the past. . . ." [d.
146. See id.
147. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848, at *11-16 (9th eir. Mar. 6, 1996). See also supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text for further discussion.
148. Michigan v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212, at *7 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 13, 1993).
[An exclusively historical analysis] would place a
straightjacket upon the Constitution, and not permit it to
be the living, dynamic document that has endured for more than 200 years - a document that has guided our
society through changing mores and attitudes; a document
that permits protection of fundamental liberty and personal privacy, even when history and tradition would severely intrude in these areas.
[d. See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reZ. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
149. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805.
It is also tempting . . . to suppose that the Due Process
Clause protects only those practices, defined at the most
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This was not the first time the Court recognized that narrowly
restricting a constitutional analysis of liberty interests to a list
of enumerated rights would prohibit society's ability to progress and mature. 150 In addition, the framers of the Constitution intended that it be general and dynamic in nature. 151
Therefore, despite the three-judge panel's concern that "no
constitutional right to aid in killing oneself has ever been asserted and upheld,"152 history and tradition reveal the value
of self-determination, including "the right of every individual to
specific level, that were protected against governmental
interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified. But such a view would be inconsistent with our law. It is a promise of the Constitution
that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.
[d. (emphasis added). The Court offered Loving v. Virginia as an example of the
Court finding a liberty interest protected against state interference, despite the
fact that marriage is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. [d. (citing Lov·
ing, 388 U.S. at 12). The Court cites other examples of the Supreme Court derming liberty interests where none was defined in the Constitution. [d. (citing Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
684-86 (1977); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82, 486-88 (Goldberg, J., joined by
Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring), 500-02 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment), 502-07 (White, J., concurring in judgment); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923».
150. See Casey, 112 S. Ct at 2805.
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in
the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the
freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep
and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, . . . and
which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment.
[d. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from
dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)) (emphasis added).
151. Frederick, supra note 55, at 77. "[A] minute detail of particular rights is
certainly far less applicable to a constitution like that under consideration, which
is merely intended to regulate the general political interest of the nation, than to
one which has the regulation of every species of personal and private concerns."
[d. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton» (emphasis added).
152. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.
1995).
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the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others unless by clear and unquestioned authority of law.,,153 Therefore, the en banc court correctly recognized that this tradition includes choices about
death. 154
2. Liberty Interest
In Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, without
any legal authority or analysis, the three-judge panel dismissed Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey155 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health 156
as precedent to assert the right to die. 157 This action conflicts
with the three-judge panel's particular concern for adhering to
legal precedent. 158

Casey defined what issues fall within the Fourteenth
Amendment's liberty interest. 159 The United States Supreme

153. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
154. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848, at *18 (9th Cir Mar. 6, 1996).
Certainly, few decisions are more personal, intimate or
important than the decision to end one's life, especially
when the reason for doing so is to avoid excessive and
protracted pain. Accordingly, we believe the cases from
Pierce through Roe provide strong general support for our
conclusion that a liberty interest in controlling the time
and manner of one's death is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[d. See also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 343 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). "Choices about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty,
and the concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our own
mortality are undoubtedly 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.'" [d. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934».
155. 112 S. Ct 2791 (1992).
156. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
157. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir.
1995).
158. [d. at 591.
159. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807. Casey held:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education... .
These matters . . . involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
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Court acknowledged that its purpose did not include imposing
a particular moral standard upon the people. 160 The same
kind of decision employed in the abortion right exists in the
right to die. 161 A terminally ill patient's decision between life

central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State.
Id.
The Supreme Court has also held that "lilt is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are
personal decisions 'relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia; procreation, Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson; contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird; family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts; and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society
of Sisters; Meyer v. Nebraska.'" Carey v. Population Servo Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 68485 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973» (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). Furthermore, an "interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions" exists. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)
(referring to decision-making within the doctor-patient relationship). The Court
held that abortion falls into this liberty interest. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
160. Id. at 2806.
Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our
most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control
our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all,
not to mandate our own moral code. The underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these
philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a
woman lacks all choice in the matter.
Id.
161. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848, at *19 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). "Like the decision of whether or not to have
an abortion, the decision how and when to die is one of 'the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal
dignity and autonomy.'" Id.
[I]t does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe
[abortion] in all instances. That is because the liberty of
the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human
condition and so unique to the law. . . . Her suffering is
too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and culture. The destiny of the woman must be
shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her
spiritual imperatives and her place in society. . . . These
are intimate views with infinite variations, and their
deep, personal character underlay our decisions in
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807-08.
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and death directly affects his or her life, much the same way a
woman's choice to have an abortion will directly affect her
life. 162
The Cruzan Court brought the interest in making personal
decisions to the context of decisions to die. 163 Cruzan held
that a right to refuse all medical treatment, including lifesaving hydration and nutrition, is constitutionally protected. l64 This right adheres even if the withdrawal of treatment
will result in death. 165 Thus, by giving a terminally ill, mentally competent patient the right to remove treatment, the
United States Supreme Court created a constitutional right to
die. 166 Encompassed within this right to die is the right to assistance to die. 167 Fortunately, the en bane court recognized

162. Brief of Appellees at 12, n.9, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington,
49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.) (No. 94-35534) (1995). Patient-plaintiffs point out that none
of the conflicting interests in the abortion decision exist in the terminally ill
patient's decision:
The counterpart to "the woman who must live with her
decision" is the terminally ill patient, who will not survive
the act in question. The "persons who perform and assist
the procedure" will only do so if they support the
patient's decision. The interests of "spouse, family and
society which must confront the knowledge that . . . procedures that some deem an act of violence against an
innocent life [exist]" are not implicated since there is no
"innocent life". Indeed, interests of spouse, family and
society will be advanced by recognizing the patient's
rights, thereby easing the burden on families who now
watch helplessly as loved ones beg futilely for assistance
in easing a tortured death. The interest of the separate
"life that is aborted" has no counterpart in the decision of
a dying person to hasten his or her own death.
ld.
163. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). "The
choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality." ld. at 281. By reviewing the standard of proof for deciding if
the patient made this choice, the Court demonstrated that its interest was in
ensuring a voluntary decision, not in interfering with this decision. See id. at 28285.
164. ld. at 279.
165. See w.
166. ld. See Helms, supra note 78, at 174-76.
167. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848, at *8 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). The en bane court cited Roe v. Wade to demonstrate that the Supreme Court first determined that a liberty interest in a certain medical procedure (abortion) existed. ld. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973». It then proceeded to hold that assistance in obtaining that medical proce-
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the value of abortion and right-to-die precedents as they relate
to this case. 168
In Compassion in Dying, the three-judge panel failed to
recognize that the zone of privacy within the Fourteenth
Amendment's liberty interest includes a right to make decisions within the context of a doctor-patient relationship.169 A
patient's confidence in this doctor-patient relationship is essential when that patient makes end-of-life decisions. 17o Since a
terminally ill patient's decision to die through treatment or
lack of treatment is typically within the doctor-patient rela-

dure must necessarily exist. [d. (citing Roe, 410 U.S. 113). Like the Washington
statute at issue, the statute in Roe only prohibited assisting in the procedure, but
did not prohibit performing that procedure on oneself. [d. (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at
151-52). See also Brief of Appellees at 14, n.12, Compassion in Dying, (No. 9435534); supra note 99 for further discussion.
168. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996).
169. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). Whalen did not disturb the lower
court's holding that the "doctor-patient relationship is one of the zones of privacy
accorded to constitutional protection." Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 936
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977). Supporting the interpretation that the Court's omission could be construed
to include the doctor-patient relationship in the privacy interest is Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413, U.S. 49, 66, n.13 (1973): "[T]he constitutionally protected
privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just
concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship. Such
protected privacy extends to the doctor's office, the hospital . . . or as otherwise
required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved." See also Todd David
Robichaud, Toward a More Perfect Union: A Federal Cause of Action for Physician
Aid-in-Dying, 27 U. MICH J.L. REF. 521, 532-33 (1994).
170. See QUILL, supra note 14, at 44-52. Dr. Quill discusses the important values involved when a physician consults with his or her patient about treatment
decisions. [d. These values include informed, shared decision-making between patient and doctor; person-centered care and respect for the patient's decisions; acknowledging the powers and limitations of medical care; the problems with prolonging life at the expense of the patient's desire to reduce suffering; and a
patient's dignified death. [d.
[The physician's role is] to inform and learn from each
person; to help them make the best choices, given their
values and the nature of their illnesses; to ensure that
they did not feel unnecessarily isolated and to try to give
them as much control and latitude as possible. Caring
humanely for the dying and trying to help them find a
dignified death is a fundamentally vital role for physicians.
[d. at 52.
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tionship, this decision invokes the privacy interest of that relationship.17l
B. STATE INTERESTS
Once a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause is
found, the individual's constitutional rights must be balanced
against relevant state interests to determine whether those
rights were violated.172 The Washington Supreme Court had
listed its interests against allowing physician-assisted death
as: the preservation of life; the protection of interests of innocent third parties; the prevention of suicide; and the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 173
However, in Compassion in Dying, the three-judge panel erroneously listed Washington's interests based upon two task
force reports issued in different states, neither of which were
available to the district court during the original proceedings.174 In addition, some of these listed interests do not relate to the issue presented in this case; specifically, whether
the right to die applies to terminally ill, mentally competent
adults, who, uncoerced, choose to hasten death. 175 The en

171. Id. at 45-46.
172. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)
(citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982»; Compassion in Dying, 1996
WL 94848, at *5.
173. In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (Wash. 1987) (citing In re
Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983».
174. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 592 (9th
Cir. 1995). New York and Michigan issued the task force reports. Id. See supra
note 111 for a discussion of these task force reports. See supra notes 112-122 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the interests.
175. See Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592-93. For example, the three-judge
panel stated there is an "interest in protecting all of the handicapped from societal
indifference and antipathy." Id. This interest may be important, but it is irrelevant
in the context at issue which includes only terminally ill patients, not otherwise
disabled people. In addition, the three-judge panel is concerned that elderly or
infirm people will be subjected to psychological pressure to consent to their death
and that minorities and the poor will be exploited. Id. at 592. Although these are
important concerns, they are misplaced here because this case concerns a voluntary, uncoerced decision to hasten death, without psychological or economic pressure or exploitation. These valid concerns might fall into the interest against
abuse also cited, but unexplained, by the three-judge panel. See id. at 592-93.
Despite the three-judge panel's concern for possible abuse, legalizing physician-assisted death and providing for strict guidelines might actually reduce any
abuse already in existence. See QUILL, supra note 14, at 167.
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bane court did not commit this same error, but instead listed
state interests which overlap and even expand those articulated by the Washington Supreme Court. 176 The following disThere may be more risk for abuse and idiosyncratic decision-making with such secret practices than with a more
open, carefully defined practice. . . . [T]here is more risk
for vulnerable patients and for the integrity of the profession in such hidden practices, however well intended, than
there would be in a more open process restricted to competent patients who met carefully defined criteria.
[d. at 166-67. Various surveys show that between 3% and 37% of responding physicians have secretly hastened a patient's death. [d. at 159. However, since no
legal or professional guidelines were in effect, every one of these doctors may have
committed an "abuse" by not following any proscribed safeguards. See id. at 167.
For instance, Dr. Jack Kevorkian administered an "abuse" when he allegedly
helped a breast cancer patient to die. Body in Auto is Reported to be Kevorkian's
26th Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, November 9, 1995, at A14. However, after the
patient's autopsy, the medical examiner disputed the presence of any cancer in the
patient. After Her Suicide, a Clash Over How III a Kevorkian Patient Was, N.Y.
TIMES, November 10, 1995, at A13. If guidelines existed, which would include
requiring other physicians' diagnoses that the patient is, indeed, terminally ill,
abuses such as these would be greatly reduced. See QUILL, supra note 14, at 16667.
Dr. Quill presents the following potential guidelines: (1) The patient must
repeatedly request to die. The physician must understand the consequences to the
patient if the patient is forced to continue suffering. This will help the doctor to
establish the rationality of the patient's choice. [d. at 161. (2) The patient must
make his or her decision with the understanding of its implications and consequences. The physician must make sure this decision is not due to depression. The
patient should also undergo a psychiatric evaluation. [d. at 161-62. (3) The patient
must be incurably and terminally ill with a condition that causes severe, unrelenting, intolerable suffering and pain. The patient's decision should be based on
avoiding any more of this suffering. [d. at 162. (4) The patient's decision must not
be based on inadequate comfort care. That is, all reasonable methods of comfort
care must be considered and exhausted before considering hastening death. [d. (5)
Hastening death should only be done in the context of a meaningful doctor-patient
relationship. Unlike Dr. Kevorkian's methods, the doctor and the patient should
have had a relationship not based solely on the request to hasten death. At the
very least, the doctor should try to know the patient and make sure the patient
has made a decision that is right for him or her. [d. at 162-63. (6) The physician
should consult another doctor to ensure that the patient's decision is voluntary
and uncoerced, that it is not based on depression or other factors, and that the
patient's diagnosis and prognosis is accurate. [d. at 163. (7) Precise documentation
should exist to ensure the prior conditions have been met. This would include
requiring the patient, the primary physician, and the consulting physician or physicians to sign a consent form. [d. at 163-64. (8) No physician should be required
to participate in the patient's decision if that physician's personal feelings and
beliefs are contrary to hastening death. [d. at 163.
176. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848, at *21 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). See id. at *21-33 for the en banc court's
thorough discussion of the state interests it identified, which are: (1) preserving
life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) avoiding the involvement of third parties and in

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

33

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 5

34

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1

cussion focuses specifically on the state interests previously set
forth by the Washington Supreme Court.177
1. Preservation of Life
The Washington Supreme Court has held that interest in
preserving life "weakens considerably... if treatment will
merely postpone death for a person with a terminal and incurable condition.... [T]he terminally ill individual's right ...
must prevail.'>178 In addition, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that the interest in preserving life is not
absolute when it guaranteed the right to withdraw medical
treatment, even for those who will die. 179 The Supreme Court
also acknowledged that it could not substitute its own moral
judgment about the meaning of life in place of an individual's
judgment. 180 Washington State also acknowledged that its
interest in the preservation of life is not absolute. 181

precluding the uses of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; (4) protecting family
members and loved ones; (5) protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and
(6) avoiding adverse consequences. Id.
177. In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (Wash. 1987) (citing In re
Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983».
178. Id. Other jurisdictions have also held this interest weakens as the patient
approaches death. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 (Mass. 1977).
179. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). See
also Frederick, supra note 55, at 88-89.
180. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2806 (1992). "[Tlhe regulation of constitutionally protected decisions ...
must be predicated on legitimate state concerns other than disagreement with the
choice the individual has made. . .. Otherwise, the interest in liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause would be a nullity." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 313 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990» (ellipsis in
original).
181. See generally WASH. REV.' CODE ANN. § 70.122.010 et seq. (West & Supp.
1995). By allowing a terminally ill patient on life support to decide to have that
support withdrawn, Washington recognizes that not all lives require preservation
at all costs. See generally id. Although Washington has a legitimate interest in
preventing suicide and preserving life, it has carved out an exception for terminally ill patients by allowing for this withdrawal without any sanctions against the
patient's physicians. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.030(1), 70.122.051 (West
Supp. 1995).
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2. Protection of Third Party Interests
The interest in protecting third parties stems from the
state's interest to intervene to protect innocent lives, particularly a patient's minor children. 182 However, New York's
highest court held that "the patient's right to decide the course
of his or her own medical treatment [is] not conditioned on the
patient being without minor children.... [A state cannot prohibit parents from] engaging in dangerous activities because
there is a risk that their children will be left orphans. "183 Additionally, allowing the patient to choose to die will actually
serve the third party's interest because terminating the
patient's pain and suffering will also relieve the incredible
amount of stress and emotional distress experienced by the
third party.184 In any case, this decision is usually made as a
family, accounting for the interests of each family member. 185
3. Prevention of Suicide
Suicide is often defined as an irrational choice to die generally resulting from mental illness or severe depression. 185
However, the majority of terminally ill people who choose to
hasten death do not make this decision based on mental illness
or depression. 187 The Washington Legislature could introduce
safeguards to prevent terminally ill persons from hastening
death based on depression. 188 Therefore, rational "suicide,"
such as the type presented in Compassion in Dying, should not

182. Robichaud, supra note 169, at 537.
183. [d. (quoting Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 83-84 (N.Y. 1990».
184. Scott I. Davidson, But, Why Do We Shoot Horses?: An Analysis of the
Right to Die and Euthanasia, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 115, 128 (1994).
185. [d.
186. See HUMPHRY, supra note 14, at 12-13; QUILL, supra note 14, at 115.
187. Brief of Appellees at 15, n.13, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.) (94-35534) (1995). "[I]t is a myth that major clinical
depression ordinarily accompanies terminal illness." [d. (quoting NEW YORK STATE
TASK FORCE, supra note 111, at 16, 21). Furthermore, the report acknowledges
that depression in the terminally ill can be diagnosed. [d. (quoting NEW YORK
STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 111, at 13, 26).
188. [d. at 16.
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be criminalized based on the same policies as irrational
suicide. 189
In addition, Washington's interest in preventing suicide is
not absolute because no Washington statute prohibits the act
of suicide. 190 Preventing suicide in the context at issue really
means prolonging the dying process for terminally ill patients. 191 Washington has already recognized the need for an
exception to its interest against suicide in cases of terminally
ill patients by allowing these patients to make the decision to
withdraw life sustaining treatment, even if this withdrawal
will result in death. 192 However, inexplicably, Washington allows this exception for only some of its terminally ill patients,
rather than all. 193
4.

Interest in the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Profession

The three-judge panel based its concern about the ethical
integrity of the medical profession on the concept that a doctor
dominates over his or her patients, thereby having the ability
to inflict undue influence to obtain a consent to death. 194
However, when dealing with dying patients, a physician's role
is to care humanely for those patients and to help them find a
dignified death. 195 If the patient and the doctor agree that all

189. See Frederick, supra note 55, at 93-94.
190. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1464, n.9
(W.D. Wash. 1994). See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988).
This statute amended the previous Washington statute which prohibited attempted
suicide, by removing that prohibition. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1464,
n.9. The Washington Legislature determined that the person who attempted suicide should not be punished if the attempt was unsuccessful. Id. Therefore, if a
physician helps another to commit suicide, only the physician is legally responsible, not the person who chose to die. Id.
191. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1464.
192. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West Supp. 1995) (permitting
withdrawal of medical treatment, even if the withdrawal is sure to result in
death).
193. See id.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988).
194. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 592 (9th
Cir. 1995).
195. QUILL, supra note 14, at 52. More specifically, a physician should inform
and learn from each patient; help the patient make the best decision; prevent the
feeling of isolation in the patient; and give the patient as much control and latitude as possible. Id.
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comfort care methods are exhausted and hastened death is the
only answer, the doctor would be forced either to ignore the
patient's request due to legal constraints, or to act in secret
without the benefits of consultation, support from colleagues,
and compliance with other possible safeguards. 196 One noted
physician concluded that this secret practice will actually harm
medical integrity because this "covert practice discourages
open and honest communication between physicians, their colleagues, and their dying patients."197

c.

EQuAL

PROTECTION

Washington State allows one to hasten death passively by
withdrawing treatment or nutrition and hydration, but does
not allow one to actively take steps to hasten death. 198 As no
distinction between active or assisted death and passive death
exists, Washington violated the equal protection rights of those
who request to hasten death but are "unfortunate" to not require life-sustaining treatment to remain alive. 199
Both passive and active death require another person to
help effectuate death. 20o Active steps must be taken by the
physician to ensure the death of the patient. 201 In either instance, death would not occur but for the physician's active
participation. 202 As Cruzan held that a patient has the right

196. Id. at 166.
197. Id.
198. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988); In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445,
454 (Wash. 1987).
199. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 597 (9th
Cir. 1995).
200. Helms, supra note 78, at 176. "By withdrawing nutrition and hydration
from a patient . . . the physician sets in course an action that will inevitably and
directly cause the death of the patient. . . . [D]eath is [now] certain and has been
purposely induced. . . . If action is being purposely taken that will bring about
certain death, merely waiting for the effect of that action will seem inhumane." Id.
at 176-77, n.23 (quoting Victor G. Rosenblum & Clarke D. Forsythe, The Right to
Assisted Suicide: Protection of Autonomy or an Open Door to Social Killing?, 8
ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 24-25 (1990».
201. Id. at 177.
202. Id. "Turning off the respirator is viewed by some physicians as an act
which directly involves the doctor in ending the patient's life. . . . [T]uming off
the respirator is euthanasia in the sense of direct[ly causing death]." Id. at 177,
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to request the physician to actively remove all life-sustaining
treatment, the doctor is not liable or culpable when he or she
removes that treatment.203 As a result, the doctor's legal culpability, or lack thereof, is the same in either case. 204 In both
instances, the doctor acts to end the patient's suffering according to that patient's rational decision. 205 Further, in his
Cruzan concurrence, Justice Scalia stated that there is no legal
distinction between actively or passively causing one's own
death. 2°°
Therefore, as no legal distinction between active and passive death exists, Washington's disparate treatment of terminally ill patients must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 207 Washington's interests are not compelling enough to outweigh terminally ill patients' equal protection rights. 208 Therefore, the three-judge panel erroneously
found the Washington statute constitutiona1. 209 The en bane
court should have considered and upheld the district court's
decision that the statute violated equal protection, in order to
resolve this area in the law and set precedent for the future. 210

n.28 (quoting DIANE CRANE, THE SANCTITY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYSICIAN'S TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS 74 (1975».
203. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
204. Helms, supra note 78, at 178.
205. [d.
206. Cruzan 497 U.S. at 296-97. Scalia's concurrence in Cruzan states:
Starving oneself to death is no different from putting a
gun to one's temple as far as the common law definition
of suicide is concerned; the cause of death in both cases
is the suicide's conscious decision to put an end to his
own existence. [Tlhe common law [alsol rejected the action-inaction distinction in other contexts involving the
taking of human life.
[d.
207. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 597 (9th Cir.
1995) (Wright, J., dissenting) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985».
208. See supra notes 172-197 and accompanying text for discussion.
209. See Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d 586, 594-97; Petition for RehearingISuggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.) (No. 94-35534) (1995).
210. The en bane court declined to consider the plaintiffs equal protection
claim, holding that its analysis of the due process liberty interest was sufficient to
declare the Washington statute unconstitutional as it applied to terminally ill,
mentally competent adults, who request physician-prescribed medication to hasten
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, the threejudge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that a terminally ill,
mentally competent adult has no right to a doctor's assistance
in terminating his or her life. 211 That is, the three-judge panel held that a due process liberty interest in actively causing
one's own death, and assistance to do so, does not exist.212
Neither does an equal protection right exist, as compared to
those similarly situated patients who may remove life-saving
treatment or nutrition and hydration, resulting in death. 213
However, in a comprehensive opinion, the Ninth Circuit en
bane court reversed the three-judge panel's opinion. 214
Analogizing Compassion in Dying to previous cases regarding
abortion and the right-to-die, the en bane court held that "a
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in determining the
time and manner of one's own death" exists.215 The en bane
court weighed this liberty interest against six state interests
identified by the court. 216 These interests include a general
state interest in preserving life, and a more specific state interest in preventing suicide.217 Additionally, the court identified
the state's other interests as avoiding the involvement of third
parties and precluding the use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue
influence; protecting family members and loved ones; protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and avoiding adverse consequences if the statute at issue is declared unconstitutional. 218 After balancing these interests, the en bane court
held that the statutory language, "or aids another person to
attempt suicide," violates the Due Process Clause of the Four-

their deaths. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848, at *39 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996).
211. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995),
rev'g 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848
(9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996).
212. [d.
213. [d.
214. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996), rev'g 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
215. [d. at *1, 6-21.
216. [d. at *21.
217. [d. at *1, 21-26.
218. [d. at *1, 26-33.
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teenth Amendment, since it prohibits physicians from prescribing life-ending medication to terminally ill, mentally competent
adults who choose to hasten their own deaths. 219
The en bane intentionally did not address the equal protection argument. 220 The en bane court stated that since it already held that the statute is unconstitutional as applied, it
did not need to address whether a second constitutional violation existed. 221
Right-to-die issues have received much publicity in the
recent past, and have been the subject of considerable litigation across the nation. To quell the litigation and establish a
clear constitutional interpretation, the United States Supreme
Court surely will need to address this sensitive and controversial issue.
Cara Elkin·

219. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *1, 37-38. The statute at issue
in this case states:
Promoting a suicide attempt. (1) A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or
aids another person to attempt suicide. (2) Promoting a
suicide is a Class C felony.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988).
220. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *39.
221. [d.
.. Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996. This note is dedicated to my father, Martin Elkin.
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